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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Right now, I feel like I could take on the whole empire myself,” Dak 
declared shortly before the Battle of Hoth.1 Though Luke Skywalker’s co-
pilot did not mean American federal bureaucracy, the United States 
Congress shared a similar disdain for growing executive power when it 
passed the Congressional Review Act (CRA) in 1996. Little did Congress 
know, it would take twenty years to actually take on the executive branch. 
However, in the past five years, the CRA has become a critical congressional 
tool for both Republicans and Democrats. 
Republicans started using the CRA more frequently during the Obama 
Administration—a product of their congressional majorities and skepticism 
for new regulation.2 But, without the White House, they could do little to 
check new regulations promulgated by President Obama’s Administration.3 
Following the election of President Donald Trump, Republicans felt 
they finally could tackle the administrative state that their progressive 
opponents spent decades building through legislation, court cases, and 
countless major regulations. Republicans acted swiftly to strike down 
Obama-era regulations using the CRA.4 Few on Capitol Hill or in the 
conservative policy community expected this many successful CRA actions.5 
Many noted the Republican Senate majority was thin and floor time would 
be consumed with health-care repeal votes, nominations, and possible votes 
on tax reform.6 
 
 1. THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK (20th Century Fox 1980). 
 2. U.S. H.R., History, Art, and Archives, Party Divisions of the House of 
Representatives, http://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/ 
[https://perma.cc/MU67-SB2A]; U.S. S., Art and History, United States 
Senate Party Division, https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm [https://perma.cc/9JH6-
GJB6]. 
 3. Thomas Frank, Republicans: We Don’t Need No Regulation, THE GUARDIAN, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/06/republicans-no-business-regulation 
[https://perma.cc/KXX2-W9HL]. 
 4. Signed into Law: Congressional Review Act (CRA) Resolutions, House Republican 
Conf. (Jun. 1, 2018) (listing the sixteen Congressional Review Act resolutions repealing 
regulations originating from the Obama Administration), http://www.gop.gov/cra/ 
[https://perma.cc/J6WK-8GP9]. 
 5. Conversations with congressional employees suggested that Congress would repeal 
a maximum of twelve regulations. Some staff predicted only one or two successful CRA 
resolutions. 
 6. Sam Brodey, The 5 Things the Republican Congress Will Get Done – or at Least 
Try to – in 2017, MINNPOST, https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2017/01/5-things-
republican-congress-will-get-done-or-least-try-2017/ [https://perma.cc/QGB8-ANGK]. 
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The policy community doubted that a majority of Senate Republicans 
would agree on more than eight to ten resolutions to disapprove.7 
Furthermore, many were certain that Democrats would almost universally 
oppose Republican attempts to undo President Obama’s environmental 
and labor standard accomplishments.8 However, according to some 
scholars, Congress exceeded expectations and nullified sixteen regulations 
using the CRA’s provisions.9 
Moreover, the decision of Senate Democrats to wield the CRA to press 
for a vote to overturn the Federal Communications Commission’s net 
neutrality repeal showed the CRA has become more than a partisan 
cudgel.10 The CRA is now an institutionalized tool of the legislative branch 
to check the executive power. Democrats shifted from arguing that the CRA 
was an extreme mechanism to undermine President Obama’s 
accomplishments to employing the CRA to advance their own agenda.11 
Additionally, Congress has found new and innovative ways to employ 
the CRA to overturn executive branch actions.12 At first, only the province 
of a widely dismissed 2017 Wall Street Journal editorial,13 Congress asked 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) about the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB’s) auto-lending guidance document.14 
The GAO ruled the guidance constituted a rule under the CRA, even 
 
 7. Based on personal conversations with scholars at the Brookings Institution, the 
Mercatus Center, and the George Washington Regulatory Studies Center. 
 8. See e.g., Michelle V. Rafter, The Workplace Legacy of Barack Obama, 
WORKFORCE, https://www.workforce.com/2017/01/17/workplace-legacy-barack-obama/ 
[https://perma.cc/75ZE-B8QC] (discussing improved labor standards under President 
Obama); Keith Gaby, Ready to Defend Obama’s Environmental Legacy? Top 10 
Accomplishments to Focus on, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, 
https://www.edf.org/blog/2017/01/12/ready-defend-obamas-environmental-legacy-top-10-
accomplishments-focus [https://perma.cc/N4WW-H4E6] (discussing the environmental 
protection accomplishments of the Obama Administration). 
 9. House Republican Conf., supra note 4. 
 10. See S.J. Res. 52, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 11. Id.; see also 163 CONG. REC. H831–40 (2017) (discussing Congressman James 
McGovern’s (D-MA) argument against striking down the Bureau of Land Management’s 
Stream Protection Rule). 
 12. See Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Requirements 
Act, Pub. L. No. 115-72, 132 Stat. 1290 (2018) (nullifying down the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau’s auto lending guidance document). 
 13. See Kimberly Strassel, A GOP Regulatory Game Changer, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 
2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-gop-regulatory-game-changer-
1485478085/ [https://perma.cc/FL2W-CFKC]. 
 14. See GAO Issues Opinions on Applicability of Congressional Review Act to Two 
Guidance Documents, EVERYCRSREPORT (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.everycrsreport.com
/reports/IN10808.html [https://perma.cc/5GQ5-K66Y]. 
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though it was issued beyond the sixty-legislative-day-review window outlined 
in the CRA.15 The use of the CRA to nullify past guidance documents is 
profound and has significant potential ramifications. 
Congress can now go back years, even decades, to strike down past 
administrative guidance.16 Although a new president could unilaterally 
rescind the guidance issued by a previous administration, the CRA provides 
an added layer of protection by ensuring that a future executive cannot 
reissue the rule “in substantially the same form.”17 There has not yet been 
any litigation surrounding this ambiguous statement since many agencies shy 
away from reissuing the rule, leaving the nullified policy in regulatory 
purgatory.18 However, now that sixteen additional rules have been nullified, 
it is more likely that a previously rejected rule might rise from the grave—
creating the possibility of litigation over the “substantially the same form” 
language.19 
This article argues that the CRA has played a role rebalancing power 
between the executive and legislative branches. Congressional use of the 
CRA by both parties—on major rules and guidance—has put every future 
executive on notice that Congress will scrutinize the process (regardless of 
whether rules are submitted to Congress in the correct manner) and the 
substance of future executive action. 
Part II offers a history of the CRA from its beginnings as part of a 
unicameral legislative veto to the modern CRA in 1996, including the 
limited debate surrounding CRA passage. The article also surveys the 
relevant dormancy period of the CRA from 1997 to 2016. Part III describes 
the current environment, including the reemergence of the CRA after the 
2016 election. Part IV discusses bipartisan use of the CRA to strike down 
agency action and the institutionalization of the CRA. Part V surveys the 
CRA’s future and examines how the past few years might influence future 
executive action. 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 57, 115th Cong. (2018) (disapproving the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau’s auto lending guidance far outside of the CRA’s “carryover” period). 
 17. See 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2) (1996). 
 18. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 6, 107th Cong. (2001) (nullifying down the Department of 
Labor’s ergonomics rule in 2001). Yet, after more than seventeen years, the DOL has yet to 
reissue the rule. See, e.g., John Ho, OSHA and Ergonomics: The Past, Present and Future, 
EHS TODAY (Jun. 22, 2017), https://www.ehstoday.com/osha/osha-and-ergonomics-past-
present-and-future [https://perma.cc/XZH4-PMUD]. 
 19. See House Republican Conf., supra note 4. 
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II. HISTORY OF THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT 
In INS v. Chadha, the Supreme Court struck down the last vestiges of 
the legislative veto.20 Following this decision, Congress struggled to check 
executive regulation for more than a decade. Congress could always pass a 
law striking down a regulation, but that would likely require a two-thirds vote 
in both houses of Congress since any sitting president would presumably 
object to a legislative attempt to rescind a recent rule.21 It takes years—
sometimes decades—to implement a regulation, and presidents are rarely 
willing to sign away rules after such a thorough vetting by the president’s own 
appointees.22 
After Chadha, Congress could still employ appropriations “riders,” 
which insert a restriction on funding for a policy disfavored by Congress into 
a larger appropriations bill necessary to operate the federal government.23 
Riders are constitutional because the president must ultimately sign them 
into law. Typically, the executive and legislative branches will reach an 
agreement regarding the acceptable restrictions on new rules.24 For example, 
President Obama signed several larger legislative packages with 
appropriations riders buried in them that limited the immediate 
implementation of his own rules.25 However, Congress found that passing 
new legislation and appropriations riders did not allow it to effectively 
control administrative action. Congress wanted a more immediate and 
permanent way to check the executive branch that did not require veto-
proof majorities. Surprisingly, Congress found a solution through legislation 
with broad bipartisan support.26 
 
 20. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding that a one-chamber legislative veto 
over executive branch action is unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution’s 
presentment and bicameralism requirements). 
 21. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 22. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 571.111 (2019) (codifying the Department of 
Transportation’s rear-view camera rule, which was in pre-rule stage in the spring of 2009, but 
the final version was not effective until June 6, 2014). 
 23. See, e.g., U.S. Senate, U.S. Senate Glossary Term, 
https://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/rider.htm [https://perma.cc/Q4AV-SB7M]. 
 24. Erik Wasson, Obama Says He’s Not Bound by Guantanamo, Gun-Control 
Provisions, THE HILL (Dec. 23, 2011), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/201245-obama-
says-he-wont-be-bound-by-guantanamo-gun-control-portions-of-omnibus 
[https://perma.cc/Y52A-C2ZW].   
 25. Id. 
 26. Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 251, 
110 Stat. 847, 869-74 (1996) (passing the U.S. Senate with unanimous consent and the U.S. 
House of Representatives 328-91 as part of the broader Contract with America Advancement 
Act of 1996). 
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A. Historical Vestiges 
When Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1952, 
it reserved the right for either the House of Representatives or the Senate 
to invalidate a decision of the executive; namely, the decision of the attorney 
general to allow a deportable immigrant to remain in the United States.27 
Few in Congress at the time likely understood the weight of this provision. 
However, seventeen years later, this provision would find itself in the 
Supreme Court.28 
In Chadha, Jagdish Rai Chadha, overstayed his student visa and the 
Immigration and Nationalization Service (INS) ordered him to provide a 
reason why he should not be deported.29 Then, an immigration judge, acting 
pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act, suspended Chadha’s 
deportation.30 The House of Representatives overturned the suspension and 
the immigration court reopened the deportation proceedings.31 Chadha 
then argued that the legislative veto portion of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act violated the U.S. Constitution, specifically alleging it violated 
the bicameral and presentment requirements of Article I.32 
After finding Chadha had standing and the issue was justiciable, the 
Supreme Court agreed that the legislative veto violated Article I of the 
Constitution.33 Writing for a six-to-three majority, Chief Justice Warren 
Burger found that the House of Representatives had essentially carried out 
a legislative function when it vetoed Chadha’s suspended deportation.34 
However, the Constitution demands all legislative action pass both the 
 
 27. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414 § 244(c), 66 Stat. 216 
(1952), invalidated by I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 28. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 919. 
 29. Id. at 923. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 926. 
 32. Id. at 946, 948. 
 33. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951 (“It emerges clearly that the prescription for legislative 
action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7 represents the Framers’ decision that the legislative power of the 
Federal government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively 
considered, procedure.”). 
 34. Id. at 956 (“[W]hen the Draftsmen sought to confer special powers on one House, 
independent of the other House, or of the President, they did so in explicit, unambiguous 
terms. . . . These exceptions are narrow . . . [and] provide further support for the conclusion 
that Congressional authority is not to be implied and for the conclusion that the veto 
provided for in § 244(c)(2) is not authorized[.]”). 
6
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House of Representatives and Senate and be signed by the president.35 
Therefore, the House’s action was invalid.36 
More than a generation later, the Supreme Court’s ruling might seem 
obvious. At the time, however, the Supreme Court’s decision wrested 
substantial power from Congress. In fact, “[s]ince 1932, when the first veto 
provision was enacted into law, 295 congressional veto-type procedures 
[had] been inserted in 196 different statutes[.]”37 Nevertheless, despite 
Congress’s affection for this power, the Court declined to extend it any 
further. Chief Justice Burger wrote, “the fact that a given law or procedure 
is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, 
standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.”38 
For Congress, the Chadha decision was a major setback. Not only did 
Congress lose the legislative veto on immigration decisions, but also it lost 
the legislative veto authorized in hundreds of other statutes. This reality was 
not lost in Justice White’s dissent: 
Today the Court not only invalidates § 244(c)(2) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, but also sounds the death knell 
for nearly 200 other statutory provisions in which Congress has 
reserved a “legislative veto.” . . . The prominence of the legislative 
veto mechanism in our contemporary political system and its 
importance to Congress can hardly be overstated. It has become 
a central means by which Congress secures the accountability of 
executive and independent agencies. Without the legislative veto, 
Congress is faced with a Hobson’s choice: either to refrain from 
delegating the necessary authority, leaving itself with a hopeless 
task of writing laws with the requisite specificity to cover endless 
special circumstances across the entire policy landscape, or in the 
alternative, to abdicate its law-making function to the executive 
branch and independent agencies.39 
Justice White likely did not realize it at the time, but he was forecasting 
what many in Congress—specifically Republicans—would argue in the future 
about the nature of regulation, congressional delegation, and the balance of 
power between the executive and legislative branch. In this Hobson’s 
choice, Congress often delegates vast amounts of power to executive 
agencies by crafting legislation in broad terms and leaving the details to 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959. 
 37. Id. at 944 (quoting James Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary 
Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L. REV. 323, 324 
(1977)). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 967–68. 
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agencies.40 However, Congress could only tolerate this approach for roughly 
a decade before the legislative veto would return—this time in a new form to 
correct the bicameralism and presentment problems identified by the Court 
in Chadha. 
B. Debate and Enactment 
The 1994 “Gingrich Revolution” ushered fifty-four additional 
Republicans into the House of Representatives and nine new Republicans 
into the Senate, creating Republican majorities in both chambers.41 With 
these new majorities, Republicans moved quickly on their “Contract with 
America” that included a host of deregulatory measures beyond just the 
CRA.42 
Indeed, Congress received little credit for the amount of reform they 
successfully enacted with the help of their political opponent, President 
Clinton.43 In addition to the CRA, Congress passed the Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act, amendments to the Paperwork Reduction Act, and 
amendments to the Regulatory Flexibility Act.44 It did so, somehow, with 
strong support in both the House of Representatives and Senate.45 For as 
much controversy as the CRA garnered at the beginning of the Trump 
Administration, it was a relative afterthought during the mid-1990s. 
The CRA’s legislative history is surprisingly brief, which is one reason 
many worry about the fate of rules rescinded under its provisions. The 
prospects for crafting a second rule that is substantially dissimilar from the 
first iteration remains murky. The CRA only spans five pages of the 
 
 40. See, e.g., Does Congress Delegate Too Much Power to Agencies and What Should 
Be Done About It?: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, 
Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs of the Committee on Government Reform, 106th 
Cong. 219 (2001), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106hhrg71984/html/CHRG-
106hhrg71984.htm [https://perma.cc/WCC7-DKK9]. 
 41. U.S. H.R., History, Art, and Archives, Party Divisions of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, http://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/ 
[https://perma.cc/8LM4-CGMJ]; U.S. S., United States Senate Party Divisions, 
https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm [https://perma.cc/SY5Z-9NMS]. 
 42. See, e.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 
(1995). 
 43. See Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104–13, 109 Stat. 163 (1995); 
Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104–121, 110 Stat. 847 (1996) 
(containing amendments to the Regulatory Flexibility Act). 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Contract with America Advancement Act, supra note 43 (passing by a vote of 
328-91 in the House of Representatives and unanimously approved by the Senate). 
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Congressional Record and provides limited insight into Congressional 
intent.46 
Senators Don Nickles (R-OK), Harry Reid (D-NV), and Ted Stevens 
(R-AK) were the CRA’s chief sponsors.47 At the outset, the Senators 
addressed the defects in previous legislative vetoes: bicameralism and 
presentment.48 They noted, “[The CRA] uses the mechanism of a joint 
resolution of disapproval which requires passage . . . Congress and the 
President[.] In other words, enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval 
is the same as enactment of a law.”49 This reality is sometimes lost on critics 
of the CRA who claim it is “a legislative gimmick” or that the law is 
unconstitutional.50 
The CRA simply makes it easier to pass a law to overturn a regulation. 
Absent the CRA, if Congress and the president desired, as soon as a rule 
was published in the Federal Register, they could immediately pass a law to 
rescind it. The CRA’s main innovation is a set of expedited procedures for 
legislative action.51 CRA Section 802 ensures that all points of order against 
resolutions of disapproval are waived, motions to reconsider are not in 
order, and debate is limited to ten hours.52 
The CRA’s expedited procedures allow Congress to review a statutory 
category of federal agency rules and determine whether the rules will take 
effect.53 Essentially, the CRA directs federal agencies to submit all newly 
promulgated rules to Congress and the Comptroller General.54 Congress 
can then schedule a vote for a joint resolution of disapproval, thereby 
 
 46. See 142 Cong. Rec. 3,683–87 (1996), Congressional Review Title of H.R. 3136, 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1996-04-18/html/CREC-1996-04-18-pt1-
PgS3683.htm [https://perma.cc/L63V-LMK6]. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, 313 F. Supp. 3d 976 (D. Alaska 
2018), appeal filed, (9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2018); James Goodwin, It’s Time to Repeal the 
Congressional Review Act, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM (May 2, 2018), http://www.pro
gressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=1DBA8FE9-B109-E5C5-D4D9F870826A5050 
[https://perma.cc/K6XH-E7XN]. 
 51. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 802 (2018) (noting, for example, “An amendment to, or a 
motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business, or a 
motion to recommit the joint resolution is not in order.”). 
 52. Id. 
 53. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–02 (2018); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reawakening the Congressional 
Review Act, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 187, 191 (2018) (“The Act does so by creating a 
fast-track procedure that enables Congress to set aside any new rule it finds unwise before 
the rule can go into effect.”). 
 54. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A). 
9
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allowing the rules to be struck down without delay.55 After the resolution’s 
introduction, there must be a simple majority vote in both congressional 
bodies for the joint resolution to pass. If the resolution passes, it is then 
submitted to the president for approval.56 The president’s signature nullifies 
the rule.57 Like other legislation, even if the president were to veto the joint 
resolution of disapproval, a two-thirds majority vote in both chambers could 
override the veto.58 Once a joint resolution of disapproval is passed, the 
CRA bars federal agencies from reissuing rules that are “substantially the 
same” as those that were struck down by the resolution.59 
While the CRA provides Congress a veto power, it is only applicable 
to “rules” as defined by the CRA.60 The CRA defines a “rule” as the 
following: 
The whole or a part of an agency statement of general or 
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, 
interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the 
organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency 
and includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates, 
wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations 
thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances 
therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing 
on any of the foregoing.61 
The CRA’s definition of “rule” essentially gives Congress the ability to 
review every agency action passed.62 While the definition of “rule” under 
the CRA is broad, it explicitly excludes rules which: (1) “approve[] or 
prescribe[] for the future rates, wages, prices, services, or allowances 
therefor, corporate or financial structures, reorganizations, mergers, or 
acquisitions thereof, or accounting practices or disclosures bearing on any 
 
 55. See 5 U.S.C. § 802. 
 56. Daniel R. Perez, Congressional Review Act Fact Sheet, GEO. WASH. U. REG. 
STUD. CTR. (Nov. 21, 2016), https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/congressional-
review-act-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/BM6B-8RJH]. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1–2). 
 60. 5 U.S.C. § 804(3). 
 61. Id. (deriving definition from 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)). 
 62. Larkin, Jr. supra note 53, at 207–08 (explaining that “the federal courts have made 
clear that the term ‘rule’ must be construed broadly[,]” and “rule” as defined in the CRA is 
“broad[] enough to include virtually every statement an agency may make . . . .” (quoting 
Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 908 (5th Cir. 1983) (citation 
omitted)). 
10
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of the foregoing;”63 (2) relate to “agency management or personnel;”64 or (3) 
relate to “any rule of agency organization, procedure, or practice that does 
not substantially affect the rights or obligations of non-agency parties.”65 
While the CRA does not create a timeframe in which an agency must 
file its rule with Congress and the Comptroller General, it does provide that 
the rule will not become effective until it has been submitted.66 Generally, 
Congress has sixty legislative days from the time the rule is submitted to it 
and published in the Federal Register to determine whether it will vote down 
the rule.67 Moreover, a CRA resolution cannot be filibustered, which is the 
only reason Republicans were able to rescind sixteen regulations during 
early days of the Trump Administration.68 It is unlikely that Republicans 
could have garnered sixty votes in the Senate for any of the measures. 
Admittedly, some critics suggest that CRA resolutions impermissibly 
tip the balance of future regulation toward Congress because the regulation 
“may not be reissued in substantially the same form.”69 The reasons for 
including this restriction are somewhat apparent. Without it, agencies may 
be tempted to engage in administrative “whack-a-mole” with hopes that the 
political winds will have changed by the time the agency has churned out a 
new, but functionally identical rule. The CRA’s sponsors were clear: the 
language barring similar rules was designed “to prevent circumvention of a 
resolution [of] disapproval.”70 
There is an argument that this provision unconstitutionally binds future 
executives. Yet, so does passing a “normal” law to overturn agency action. 
Where a “normal” law is passed to overturn an agency action, it takes a law 
passed under the traditional process to rescind previous legislation (in most 
circumstances).71 Under the CRA, if a future congress and president were to 
 
 63. 5 U.S.C. § 804(3)(A). 
 64. 5 U.S.C. § 804(3)(B). 
 65. 5 U.S.C. § 804(3)(C). 
 66. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A). 
 67. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(2)(A). However, if a rule is submitted less than sixty legislative 
session days before it adjourns its final session, a new period of review becomes available to 
the incoming sessions of Congress. 5 U.S.C. § 801(d)(1)(B). 
 68. See House Republican Conf., supra note 4. 
 69. 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2) (“[A] new rule that is substantially the same as such a rule [that 
does not take effect] may not be issued, unless the reissued or new rule is specifically 
authorized by a law enacted after the date of the joint resolution disapproving the 
original rule.”). 
 70. See 142 Cong. Rec. 3,683–87, supra note 46. 
 71. Mark Strand & Tim Lang, Rescissions, Rescissions: How Congress Can Use the 
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take action in an area where Congress used the CRA to strike down a prior 
rule, passing a new law granting the agency additional jurisdiction is all that 
is required. 
Although not directly addressed in the legislative history, the CRA is 
often regarded as a tool of the legislative branch to check the executive.72 
While this is true, it is only an effective check when the president is 
supportive. Indeed, this article likely would not have been written if former 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had won the presidency and Congress had 
remained under Republican control. She likely would have vetoed every 
resolution, and there would have been less attention on fruitless attempts to 
overturn regulation. There is no doubt President Trump was eager to sign 
resolutions of disapproval.73 Before he even took office, conservatives in the 
transition team were circulating potential lame duck rules eligible for CRA 
repeal.74 
C. Infancy of CRA: 1996 to 2001 
Since the CRA’s enactment, there have been more than two hundred 
resolutions of disapproval introduced in the House and Senate.75 The 
 
 72. Dylan Scott, The New Republican Plan to Deregulate America, Explained, 
VOX, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/4/25/17275566/congressional-review-
act-what-regulations-has-trump-cut [https://perma.cc/95PW-YT2A] (“[t]he primary goal 
here is to hold the executive branch accountable . . . .”). 
 73. Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., Obama’s Midnight Regulations to Get Increased 
Scrutiny from Congress and Trump, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/sites/waynecrews/20
16/11/16/obamas-midnight-regulations-to-get-increased-scrutiny-from-congress-and-trump/ 
[https://perma.cc/9BYS-E22L]. 
 74. Id. In the months leading up to, and after, the election of 2016, I was contacted by 
members of Congress to generate a list of regulations eligible for repeal under the CRA. In 
addition, members of the transition team contacted me about providing a list of rules eligible 
for repeal. 
 75. Thirty-four resolutions disapproving of agency rules were introduced during the 
114th Congress, while eighty-nine were introduced during the 115th Congress. S.J. Res. 8, 
114th Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 29, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. Res. 152, 114th Cong. (2015); 
H.R.J. Res. 42, 114th Cong. (2015); S.J. Res. 14, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 59, 114th 
Cong. (2015); H.R. Res. 408, 114th Cong. (2015); S.J. Res. 22, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R.J. 
Res. 67, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 68, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 70, 114th 
Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 72, 114th Cong. (2015); S.J. Res. 24, 114th Cong. (2015); S.J. Res. 
23, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 71, 114th Cong. (2015); S.J. Res. 25, 114th Cong. (2015); 
H.R.J. Res. 74, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. Res. 539, 114th Cong. (2015); S.J. Res. 27, 114th 
Cong. (2015); S.J. Res. 28, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. Res. 583, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R.J. 
Res. 87, 114th Cong. (2016); S.J. Res. 33, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R.J. Res. 88, 114th Cong. 
(2016); H.R. Res. 706, 114th Cong. (2016); S.J. Res. 34, 114th Cong. (2016); S.J. Res. 35, 
114th Cong. (2016); H.R.J. Res. 95, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R. Res. 836, 114th Cong. (2016); 
S.J. Res. 38, 114th Cong. (2016); S.J. Res. 37, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R. Res. 921, 114th 
12
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majority of resolutions have been introduced in just the past five years.76 
While there was little action during the CRA’s infancy,77 there was significant 
political activity from both Democrats and Republicans.78 Shortly after the 
CRA’s passage, there was recognition from both parties that an onerous 
 
Cong. (2016); H.R.J. Res. 107, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R.J. Res. 108, 114th Cong. (2016); 
H.R.J. Res. 11, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 16, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 22, 
115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 34, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 35, 115th Cong. (2017); 
H.R. Res. 71, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. Res. 70, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 38, 115th 
Cong. (2017) (enacted); H.R.J. Res. 42, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); H.R.J. Res. 47, 115th 
Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 37, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); H.R.J. Res. 39, 115th Cong. 
(2017); S.J. Res. 12, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 45, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 
41, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); H.R.J. Res. 40, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); S.J. Res. 
10, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 36, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 46, 115th Cong. 
(2017); S.J. Res. 15, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 44, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); 
H.R.J. Res. 43, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); S.J. Res. 9, 115th Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 14, 
115th Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 11, 115th Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 13, 115th Cong. (2017); 
H.R.J. Res. 49, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. Res. 74, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 52, 115th 
Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 55, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 54, 115th Cong. (2017); 
H.R.J. Res. 58, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); H.R.J. Res. 57, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. 
Res. 59, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 56, 115th Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 19, 115th Cong. 
(2017); S.J. Res. 18, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 60, 115th Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 21, 
115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 62, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. Res. 91, 115th Cong. (2017); 
H.R. Res. 99, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 66, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); H.R.J. Res. 
67, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); H.R.J. Res. 69, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); H.R.J. Res. 
68, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 70, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. Res. 116, 115th Cong. 
(2017); H.R.J. Res. 71, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. Res. 123, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 
73, 115th Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 23, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 77, 115th Cong. (2017); 
H.R.J. Res. 82, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 83, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); H.R. Res. 
150, 115th Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 25, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 84, 115th Cong. 
(2017); S.J. Res. 26, 115th Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 27, 115th Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 28, 115th 
Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 29, 115th Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 32, 115th Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 
33, 115th Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 34, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); H.R.J. Res. 86, 115th 
Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 37, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 87, 115th Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 
38, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. Res. 230, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 97, 115th Cong. 
(2017); H.R.J. Res. 96, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 103, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. 
Res. 111, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); S.J. Res. 47, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. Res. 468, 
115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 122, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 129, 115th Cong. 
(2018); S.J. Res. 52, 115th Cong. (2018); S.J. Res. 57, 115th Cong. (2018) (enacted); S.J. Res. 
56, 115th Cong. (2018); H.R.J. Res. 131, 115th Cong. (2018); H.R.J. Res. 132, 115th Cong. 
(2018); H.R. Res. 873, 115th Cong. (2018); H.R. Res. 872, 115th Cong. (2018); S.J. Res. 63, 
115th Cong. (2018); H.R.J. Res. 140, 115th Cong. (2018); S.J. Res. 64, 115th Cong. (2018); 
H.R.J. Res. 145, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Supra note 75. 
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regulation could offend local constituencies enough to force a CRA 
resolution.79 
In the CRA’s first year, there were only two resolutions of 
disapproval.80 Only one made it to a Senate vote, but it eventually failed.81 
The measure, introduced by Senator Trent Lott (R-MS), attempted to 
rescind a rule from the Department of Health and Human Services relating 
to Medicare reimbursement rates.82 
By the next Congress (1997–1998), there were a total of six resolutions 
introduced—or roughly six percent of the volume from 2017.83 It is clear 
Congress was still learning to use the CRA. None of these measures made 
it to a vote in either chamber.84 At this point in the CRA’s existence, it was 
solely used as a partisan tool to check the opposing party in the White 
House. 
In 1999, there was only one resolution of disapproval introduced.85 In 
2000, there were four resolutions and the first Democratic attempt to 
rescind a regulation.86 On July 18, 2000, Representative Marion Berry (D-
AR) introduced a resolution of disapproval to rescind an Environmental 
Protection Agency measure implementing the Clean Water Act.87 The joint 
resolution garnered twenty-three cosponsors, but never made it to the 
House floor.88 Likewise, the three other CRA resolutions never garnered a 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. H.R.J. Res. 178, 104th Cong. (1996) (declaring that certain rules submitted by the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regarding the promotion of wholesale competition 
and stranded cost recovery shall have no force or effect); S.J. Res. 60, 104th Cong. (1996) 
(disapproving of a rule submitted by the Health Care Financing Administration relating to 
hospital reimbursement under Medicare). 
 81. Compare H.R.J. Res. 178, 104th Cong. (1996) (disapproving Orders Nos. 888 and 
889 of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission), with S.J. Res. 60, 104th Cong. (1996) 
(disapproving of a rule submitted by the Health Care Financing Administration relating to 
hospital reimbursement under Medicare). 
 82. See S.J. Res. 60, 104th Cong. (1996). 
 83. H.R.J. Res. 59, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R.J. Res. 67, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R.J. 
Res. 81, 105th Cong. (1997); S.J. Res. 25, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R.J. Res. 123, 105th Cong. 
(1998); S.J. Res. 50, 105th Cong. (1998). 
 84. See Id. 
 85. H.R.J. Res. 55, 106th Cong. (1999) (disapproving of a relating to delivery of mail 
to a commercial mail receiving agency). 
 86. H.R.J. Res. 104, 106th Cong. (2000) (disapproving a rule relating to water quality 
protections); S.J. Res. 50, 106th Cong. (2000) (disapproving a final rule concerning water 
pollution); H.R.J. Res. 106, 106th Cong. (2000) (disapproving a final rule concerning water 
pollution); H.R.J. Res. 105, 106th Cong. (2000) (disapproving relating to total maximum 
daily loads under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act). 
 87. H.R.J. Res. 105, 106th Cong. (2000). 
 88. Id. 
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vote. It is notable that—in addition to Representative Berry’s support to 
overturn the EPA regulation—seven other Democrats joined in support.89 
By the next Congress (2001–2002), legislators introduced as many 
CRA resolutions as they had during the entire prior history of the law.90 The 
timing made sense from a political perspective: Republicans still controlled 
Congress, and an outgoing Democratic administration gave way to an 
incoming Republican one. The CRA’s “carryover provision” allows the 
incoming Congress to scrutinize the last several months of regulations from 
the previous administration.91 Of the thirteen resolutions introduced, six 
were introduced by Democrats to check new actions from the Bush 
Administration.92 Given the conservative composition of Congress, none 
made it to a floor vote.93 
When Senator Don Nickles, one of the chief sponsors of the CRA in 
1996, introduced a resolution of disapproval to overturn the Department of 
Labor’s ergonomics rule, he made congressional history.94 Despite a fifty-
 
 89. See H.R.J. Res. 105 supra note 87. 
 90. S.J. Res. 6, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted); H.R. Res. 79, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R.J. 
Res. 35, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R.J. Res. 38, 107th Cong. (2001); S.J. Res. 9, 107th Cong. 
(2001); H.R.J. Res. 44, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R.J. Res. 43, 107th Cong. (2001); S.J. Res. 
14, 107th Cong. (2001); S.J. Res. 15, 107th Cong. (2001); S.J. Res. 17, 107th Cong. (2001); 
H.R. Res. 414, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R.J. Res. 92, 107th Cong. (2002); S.J. Res. 37, 107th 
Cong. (2002); H.R.J. Res. 119, 107th Cong. (2002); S.J. Res. 48, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 91. RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31160, DISAPPROVAL OF 
REGULATIONS BY CONGRESS: PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT 1–3 
(2001) (discussing 
the CRA’s disapproval procedures), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl31160.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5222-EQLH]; CURTIS W. COPELAND & RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL34633, CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT: DISAPPROVAL OF RULES IN A 
SUBSEQUENT SESSION OF CONGRESS (2008) (discussing the “carryover” procedures), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34633.pdf [https://perma.cc/2U42-FW5Y]. 
 92. S.J. Res. 9, 107th Cong. (2001) (disapproving a rule submitted by the President 
regarding the restoration of the Mexico City Policy); S.J. Res. 14, 107th Cong. (2001) 
(disapproving a rule regarding the delay in the effective date of a new arsenic standard); S.J. 
Res. 15, 107th Cong. (2001) (disapproving a rule regarding the postponement of the effective 
date of energy conservation standards for central air conditioners); S.J. Res. 17, 107th Cong. 
(2001) (disapproving a rule submitted by the President regarding the restoration of the 
Mexico City Policy); H.R.J. Res. 92, 107th Cong. (2002) (disapproving a rule regarding 
modification of the Medicaid upper payment limit for non-State government owned or 
operated hospitals); S.J. Res. 37, 107th Cong. (2002) (disapproving a rule regarding 
modification of the Medicaid upper payment limit for non-State government owned or 
operated hospitals). 
 93. See 107th Congress (2001-2003), U.S. HOUSE REPS., OFF. ART & ARCHIVES, 
https://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/107th/ [https://perma.cc/S838-
AEKZ]. 
 94. See S.J. Res. 6, 107th Cong. (2001). 
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fifty partisan split in the Senate, the resolution managed fifty-six votes in the 
Senate, including all Republicans and six Democrats.95 The vote also put the 
CRA’s streamlined procedures on full display: without the CRA’s filibuster 
preclusion, the vote to rescind never would have passed. During the debate, 
Senator Asa Hutchinson (R-AR) made his colleagues’ intent clear: 
With the CRA, we have a means by which we can address an 
agency that goes amok and passes a rule that is not in the interest 
of the American people. . . . For the first time ever, the Senate 
will today utilize the CRA to vitiate and overturn an agency rule—
that is, a several-hundred-page OSHA rule—that imposes the 
largest and most costly regulatory mandate in American history 
on the workplace. It is appropriate that this would be the first use 
for the CRA.96 
The next day, the House quickly followed suit and voted (223-206) to 
overturn the ergonomics rule.97 Although sixteen Democrats and one 
Independent voted to overturn the Clinton-era rule, thirteen Republicans 
declined to support the disapproval resolution.98 During the House debate, 
Congressman John Boehner (R-OH), then Chair of the House Education 
and Workforce Committee, made a prophetic comment on future rules 
under the CRA.99 He noted, “[a]gain, no one is opposed to providing 
appropriate ergonomics protections in the workplace. The Secretary of 
Labor has indicated her intent to pursue a comprehensive approach to 
ergonomics protections. I look forward to working with her and my 
colleagues on such an effort.”100 
The Bush Administration never pursued a new ergonomics rule, and 
there is evidence that legal uncertainty around the “substantially the same 
form” language in the CRA scared off future regulators from revisiting the 
ergonomics rule.101 
The CRA’s first few years were marked with a relative paucity of 
disapproval resolutions. However, the “perfect timing” of a Republican 
administration replacing a Democratic administration—with a friendly 
Congress—led to the first use of the CRA roughly five years after its 
 
 95. S. Roll Call Vote No. 15, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 96. Id. at 1847.   
 97. H.R. Roll Call Vote No. 33, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 98. Id. 
 99. 147 CONG. REC. 29, 685 (2001). 
 100. Id. 
 101. See, e.g., Adam M. Finkel & Jason W. Sullivan, A Cost-Benefit Interpretation of 
the “Substantially Similar” Hurdle in the Congressional Review Act: Can OSHA Ever Utter 
the E-Word (Ergonomics) Again?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 707 (2011). 
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passage.102 The legislative veto was back, if even only for an instant. It is likely 
there were no more resolutions because of the slim Republican majorities. 
Yet, unlike in 2001, that did not stop Republicans in 2017. 
D. Slow Weaponization of CRA: 2002–2015 
After Congress and the Bush Administration struck down the 
ergonomics rule, the CRA was somewhat dormant. Republicans had few 
incentives to defy the Bush Administration, and Democrats were not overly 
aggressive in their attempts to challenge his regulations especially since they 
did not control Congress until 2007. 
Despite this relative lull, there were thirty-nine CRA resolutions 
introduced between 2001 and 2009, for an average of four or five each 
year.103 There was no new resolution introduced in 2006, leading up to the 
midterm elections.104 To an extent, the CRA’s bipartisan use dispels the 
 
 102. Id. at 725–27.  
 103. S.J. Res. 6, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted); H.R. Res. 79, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R.J. 
Res. 35, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R.J. Res. 38, 107th Cong. (2001); S.J. Res. 9, 107th Cong. 
(2001); H.R.J. Res. 44, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R.J. Res. 43, 107th Cong. (2001); S.J. Res. 
14, 107th Cong. (2001); S.J. Res. 15, 107th Cong. (2001); S.J. Res. 17, 107th Cong. (2001); 
H.R. Res. 414, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R.J. Res. 92, 107th Cong. (2002); S.J. Res. 37, 107th 
Cong. (2002); H.R.J. Res. 119, 107th Cong. (2002); S.J. Res. 48, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R.J. 
Res. 3, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R.J. Res. 41, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R.J. Res. 58, 108th Cong. 
(2003); S.J. Res. 17, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R.J. Res. 72, 108th Cong. (2003); S.J. Res. 32, 
108th Cong. (2004); S.J. Res. 31, 108th Cong. (2004); S.J. Res. 4, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R.J. 
Res. 23, 109th Cong. (2005); S.J. Res. 20, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R.J. Res. 56, 109th Cong. 
(2005); H.R.J. Res. 47, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.J. Res. 49, 110th Cong. (2007); S.J. Res. 
18, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.J. Res. 51, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.J. Res. 54, 110th Cong. 
(2007); H.R.J. Res. 55, 110th Cong. (2007); S.J. Res. 20, 110th Cong. (2007); S.J. Res. 22, 
110th Cong. (2007); S.J. Res. 28, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R.J. Res. 79, 110th Cong. (2008); 
H.R.J. Res. 78, 110th Cong. (2008); S.J. Res. 30, 110th Cong. (2008); S.J. Res. 44, 110th 
Cong. (2008). 
 104. S.J. Res. 6, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted); H.R. Res. 79, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R.J. 
Res. 35, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R.J. Res. 38, 107th Cong. (2001); S.J. Res. 9, 107th Cong. 
(2001); H.R.J. Res. 44, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R.J. Res. 43, 107th Cong. (2001); S.J. Res. 
14, 107th Cong. (2001); S.J. Res. 15, 107th Cong. (2001); S.J. Res. 17, 107th Cong. (2001); 
H.R. Res. 414, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R.J. Res. 92, 107th Cong. (2002); S.J. Res. 37, 107th 
Cong. (2002); H.R.J. Res. 119, 107th Cong. (2002); S.J. Res. 48, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R.J. 
Res. 3, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R.J. Res. 41, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R.J. Res. 58, 108th Cong. 
(2003); S.J. Res. 17, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R.J. Res. 72, 108th Cong. (2003); S.J. Res. 32, 
108th Cong. (2004); S.J. Res. 31, 108th Cong. (2004); S.J. Res. 4, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R.J. 
Res. 23, 109th Cong. (2005); S.J. Res. 20, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R.J. Res. 56, 109th Cong. 
(2005); H.R.J. Res. 47, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.J. Res. 49, 110th Cong. (2007); S.J. Res. 
18, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.J. Res. 51, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.J. Res. 54, 110th Cong. 
(2007); H.R.J. Res. 55, 110th Cong. (2007); S.J. Res. 20, 110th Cong. (2007); S.J. Res. 22, 
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notion that is a purely partisan Republican tool to strike down “onerous” 
regulations. 
There were numerous Bush Administration actions to which 
Democrats objected. For example, Representative Lane Evans (D-IL) 
introduced a measure to rescind a Department of Veterans Affairs’ health 
care rule.105 Likewise, both Senator Byron Dorgan (D-ND) and 
Representative Maurice Hinchey (D-NY) introduced a CRA resolution to 
overturn the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) new media 
ownership rules.106 Senator Dorgan’s resolution even passed the Republican-
controlled Senate with fifty-five votes.107 Notably, twelve Republicans 
supported the measure in the Senate, including former Senate Majority 
Leader Trent Lott (R-MS).108 During recent CRA votes, few Democrats 
supported CRA resolutions to overturn a regulation promulgated by their 
own party.109 To many, there was bipartisan opposition to FCC’s new rule, 
and Congress (at least one chamber) objected strenuously enough to seek 
to rescind it.110 Few in Congress at the time wanted to abolish the CRA, 
knowing how close they were to achieving their own policy ends, vis a vis 
rescinding FCC’s rule.111 
By the next Congress (2005–2006), Democrats managed to get two 
CRA resolutions onto the Senate floor, but none in the House.112 Both of 
the resolutions were introduced by Democrats; one—introduced by Senator 
Kent Conrad (D-ND)—successfully passed the Senate.113 It would have 
overturned the Department of Agriculture rule on “Mad Cow Disease” risk 
 
110th Cong. (2007); S.J. Res. 28, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R.J. Res. 79, 110th Cong. (2008); 
H.R.J. Res. 78, 110th Cong. (2008); S.J. Res. 30, 110th Cong. (2008); S.J. Res. 44, 110th 
Cong. (2008). 
 105. See H.R.J. Res. 41, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 106. See S.J. Res. 17, 108th Cong. (2003). Although the FCC is an independent agency, 
and not technically part of the Bush Administration, President Bush had appointed a 
majority of the commissioners. See, e.g., Pamela McClintock, Bush 
Naming Names in D.C., VARIETY (Apr. 9, 2001), https://variety.com/2001/biz/news/bush-
naming-names-in-d-c-1117796745/ [https://perma.cc/T8F8-JYAM]. 
 107. S. Roll Call Vote No. 348, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See, e.g., H.R. Roll Call Vote No. 73, 115th Cong. (2017) (showing that there were 
only four Democrats in the U.S. House that supported the resolution to overturn the 
Department of Interior’s Stream Protection Rule). 
 110. Ben Scott, The Politics and Policy of Media Ownership, 53 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 
645, 646–47 (2004). 
 111. See id. at 664–65.  
 112. Compare S.J. Res. 4, 109th Cong. (2005); S.J. Res. 20, 109th Cong. (2005), with 
H.R.J. Res. 23, 109th Cong. (2005), and H.R.J. Res. 56, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 113. S.J. Res. 4, 109th Cong. (2005); see S. Roll Call Vote No. 19, 109th Cong. (2005). 
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zones.114 Opposition was not particularly strong in the Senate, as the CRA 
measure garnered just fifty-two votes, but eleven Republicans were upset 
enough, voting to rescind the regulation.115 The CRA measure that failed the 
Senate, introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), would have repealed 
an EPA measure “to delist coal and oil-direct utility units from the source 
category list under the Clean Air Act.”116 Despite the relatively partisan 
nature of the forty-seven to fifty-one vote against repeal, nine Republicans 
still voted for Senator Leahy’s joint resolution.117 A freshman Democrat also 
voted to repeal the EPA rule: then-Senator Barack Obama (D-IL).118 
The intentions of the vote to overturn were clear: the Bush 
Administration was attempting to degrade air quality. As Senator Frank 
Lautenberg (D-NJ) noted, “I suspect most Americans are going to be 
shocked to learn the administration wants to allow more poisonous mercury 
into the environment. But that is exactly what they are trying to do.”119 Again, 
it makes little sense for either party to voluntary cede legislative veto 
authority under the CRA. In this instance, Democrats, and many pro-
environment Republicans, objected to a rule they thought would harm air 
quality. They had the power to rescind the rule and nearly succeeded in the 
Senate.120 If these examples of Democrats objecting to regulations during the 
Bush Administration are evidence of anything, it is that Congress can have 
a legitimate policy objection to a regulation and not be “anti-regulation.” 
By the last Congress of the Bush Administration (2007-2008), the story 
was mostly the same: Democrats continued to object to President Bush’s 
domestic policy regulations. Of the thirteen measures introduced during 
this time, Democrats sponsored all of them, and one managed to pass 
through the Senate.121 Strangely, there was another push to overturn an FCC 
rule, and it passed by voice vote in the Democratic Senate.122 Yet, the House 
 
 114. S.J. Res. 4, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 115. S. Roll Call Vote No. 19, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 116. See S.J. Res. 20, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 117. S. Roll Call Vote No. 225, 109th Cong. (2005).   
 118. Id. 
 119. 151 CONG. REC. 9, 955–58, (2005). 
 120. See S. Roll Call Vote No. 19, supra note 115. 
 121. Introduced: H.R.J. Res. 47, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.J. Res. 49, 110th Cong. 
(2007); S.J. Res. 18, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.J. Res. 51, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.J. Res. 
54, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.J. Res. 55, 110th Cong. (2007); S.J. Res. 20, 110th Cong. (2007); 
S.J. Res. 22, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.J. Res. 79, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R.J. Res. 78, 110th 
Cong. (2008); S.J. Res. 30, 110th Cong. (2008); S.J. Res. 44, 110th Cong. (2008). Introduced 
and Passed Senate: S.J. Res. 28, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 122. See S.J. Res. 28, 110th Cong. (2008). 
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never took up the matter beyond initial introduction.123 This all happened 
during the middle of a presidential election year with a financial crisis to 
follow that fall, so opponents of the rule might forgive Congress for turning 
to other matters. 
By the time President Obama took office in January 2009, the partisan 
switch had largely flipped on the CRA. Although there were a few 
Democrats sponsoring resolutions to overturn regulations, they were 
objecting to independent agency actions of appointees from President Bush, 
not the Obama Administration.124 However, EPA’s actions to begin 
regulating carbon dioxide drew the ire of several “coal state” Democrats. 
For example, Representative Ike Shelton (D-MO) introduced a disapproval 
resolution following EPA’s “endangerment finding,” a regulation that 
essentially started the process of federal greenhouse gas regulation 
(GHG).125 He was joined by fifty-two other cosponsors, including twenty-six 
Democrats.126 
By the 112th Congress (2011-2012), legislators began to employ the 
CRA far more often. The 112th Congress set a record for the number of 
CRA resolutions introduced: twenty-five.127 
Republicans introduced all of these resolutions.128 However, without 
control of the Senate, none passed the upper chamber and only two passed 
 
 123. See H.R. J. Res. 79, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 124. See S.J. Res. 23, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 125. See H.R. J. Res. 76, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Congress managed to introduce twenty-five resolutions during the 112th Congress, 
compared to just eight resolutions from the prior Congress. Compare H.R.J. Res. 9, 112th 
Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res. 19, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res. 21, 112th Cong. (2011); 
H.R.J. Res. 37, 112th Cong. (2011); S.J. Res. 6, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res. 42, 112th 
Cong. (2011); H.R. Res. 200, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res. 59, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. 
Res. 61, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res. 58, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res. 60, 112th 
Cong. (2011); S.J. Res. 27, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res. 85, 112th Cong. (2011); S.J. Res. 
37, 112th Cong. (2012); S.J. Res. 36, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R.J. Res. 103, 112th Cong. 
(2012); H.R.J. Res. 104, 112th Cong. (2012); S.J. Res. 38, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R.J. Res. 
108, 112th Cong. (2012); S.J. Res. 40, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R.J. Res. 112, 112th Cong. 
(2012); H.R.J. Res. 113, 112th Cong. (2012); S.J. Res. 46, 112th Cong. (2012); S.J. Res. 48, 
112th Cong. (2012); H.R.J. Res. 118, 112th Cong. (2012); S.J. Res. 50, 112th Cong. (2012); 
H.R. Res. 788, 112th Cong. (2012); S.J. Res. 51, 112th Cong. (2012), with H.R.J. Res. 18, 
111th Cong. (2009); H.R.J. Res. 65, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R.J. Res. 66, 111th Cong. (2009); 
S.J. Res. 23, 111th Cong. (2009); S.J. Res. 24, 111th Cong. (2009); S.J. Res. 26, 111th Cong. 
(2010); H.R.J. Res. 76, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R.J. Res. 77, 111th Cong. (2010); S.J. Res. 
30, 111th Cong. (2010); S.J. Res. 39, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R.J. Res. 97, 111th Cong. (2010); 
H.R.J. Res. 100, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R.J. Res. 103, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 128. See H.R.J. Res. 9, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res. 19, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. 
Res. 21, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res. 37, 112th Cong. (2011); S.J. Res. 6, 112th Cong. 
20
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 1
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol45/iss2/1
   
370 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:2 
the House.129 Republicans might have felt emboldened to introduce a record 
number of disapproval resolutions, but they did so with the hopes of a 
Republican president in 2013. They were denied that on Election Day and 
CRA activity dropped off considerably.130 
From 2013-2014, there were only nine new CRA resolutions, the 
lowest figure since the 109th Congress (2005-2006).131 Again, without control 
of the Senate, no resolution stood the chance of passing Congress and 
arriving on President Obama’s desk. There were ten resolutions 
introduced, but they went nowhere in either congressional chamber.132 As 
previewed by EPA’s earlier endangerment finding, the agency’s rule to 
finally regulate GHG emissions from power plants drew a CRA resolution 
in both the House and Senate.133 The House resolution garnered fifty-six 
cosponsors and the Senate measure had forty-one—enough to discharge the 
measure to the floor, but there was never a vote.134 
 
(2011); H.R.J. Res. 42, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. Res. 200, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res. 
59, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res. 61, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res. 58, 112th Cong. 
(2011); H.R.J. Res. 60, 112th Cong. (2011); S.J. Res. 27, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res. 
85, 112th Cong. (2011); S.J. Res. 37, 112th Cong. (2012); S.J. Res. 36, 112th Cong. (2012); 
H.R.J. Res. 103, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R.J. Res. 104, 112th Cong. (2012); S.J. Res. 38, 
112th Cong. (2012); H.R.J. Res. 108, 112th Cong. (2012); S.J. Res. 40, 112th Cong. (2012); 
H.R.J. Res. 112, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R.J. Res. 113, 112th Cong. (2012); S.J. Res. 46, 
112th Cong. (2012); S.J. Res. 48, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R.J. Res. 118, 112th Cong. (2012); 
S.J. Res. 50, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R. Res. 788, 112th Cong. (2012); S.J. Res. 51, 112th 
Cong. (2012); H.R.J. Res. 18, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R.J. Res. 65, 111th Cong. (2009); 
H.R.J. Res. 66, 111th Cong. (2009); S.J. Res. 23, 111th Cong. (2009); S.J. Res. 24, 111th 
Cong. (2009); S.J. Res. 26, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R.J. Res. 76, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R.J. 
Res. 77, 111th Cong. (2010); S.J. Res. 30, 111th Cong. (2010); S.J. Res. 39, 111th Cong. 
(2010); H.R.J. Res. 97, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R.J. Res. 100, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R.J. 
Res. 103, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 129. H.R. J. Res. 37, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. J. Res. 118, 112th Cong. (2012). 




 131. S.J. Res. 8, 113th Cong. (2013); S.J. Res. 9, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R.J. Res. 63, 
113th Cong. (2013); H.R.J. Res. 64, 113th Cong. (2013); S.J. Res. 27, 113th Cong. (2013); 
H.R. Res. 425, 113th Cong. (2014); S.J. Res. 30, 113th Cong. (2014); S.J. Res. 35, 113th 
Cong. (2014); H.R.J. Res. 118, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 132. S.J. Res. 8, 113th Cong. (2013); S.J. Res. 9, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R.J. Res. 63, 
113th Cong. (2013); H.R.J. Res. 64, 113th Cong. (2013); S.J. Res. 27, 113th Cong. (2013); 
H.R. Res. 425, 113th Cong. (2014); S.J. Res. 30, 113th Cong. (2014); S.J. Res. 35, 113th 
Cong. (2014); H.R.J. Res. 118, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 133. See S.J. Res. 30, 113th Cong. (2014); H.R. J. Res. 64, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 134. S.J. Res. 30, 113th Cong. (2014); H.R. J. Res. 64, 113th Cong. (2013). 
21
Batkins: Congress Strikes Back: The Institutionalization of the Congressio
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2019
   
2019]   THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT 371 
During this period, Congress gradually remembered the power it 
carved out back in 1996 and began using it to address onerous regulations. 
However, it was not until the lead up to the 2016 Election (the so-called 
“midnight” year for regulation) during which CRA activity peaked to record 
levels, delivering historic results for conservatives.135 
III. CONGRESS DISCOVERS CHECKS AND BALANCES 
It is not as though Congress forgot about its ability to check the 
executive since passage of the CRA; it is just that, absent one occasion, for 
twenty years it never did.136 This was largely due to the confluence of factors 
around a transition of power between one party in the White House and 
the other—in addition to needing a Congress with a long memory, ready to 
object to regulations from the previous year. Yet, Republicans only 
employed the CRA once in 2001 and Democrats never employed it 
successfully in 2009, even though their majorities afforded some flexibility.137 
For Republicans going into 2016, they foresaw the perfect opportunity and 
devised a plan to employ the CRA more frequently. 
A. Seeds of Trump Administration Push 
The volume of regulations promulgated in the late stages of the Obama 
Administration provided ample fodder for Republicans in the House and 
Senate. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 
federal regulators issued 119 major rules in 2016, shattering the previous 
record of 100 major rules in 2010.138 For comparison, President Bush issued 
fifty-one major rules during his first midterm year (2002) and ninety-five (the 
previous record) in 2008.139 
Republicans began their push during the 114th Congress (2015-2016) 
with thirty-four CRA resolutions, breaking their previous record of twenty-
eight.140 However, the distinguishing feature about this CRA push was that 
 
 135. See Pierre Lemieux, Obama’s Record-Setting Midnight, REG. MAG. (2017), 
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2017/3/regulation-v40n1-
8_1.pdf#page=4 [https://perma.cc/4N68-28LE]. 
 136. S.J. Res. 6, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted) (disapproving rule submitted by the 
Department of Labor relating to ergonomics). 
 137. Id. 
 138. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DATABASE OF RULES, 
https://www.gao.gov/legal/other-legal-work/congressional-review-act?fedRuleSearch 
[https://perma.cc/PX2X-KDK7]. 
 139. See id. 
 140. S.J. Res. 8, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 29, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. Res. 152, 
114th Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 42, 114th Cong. (2015); S.J. Res. 14, 114th Cong. (2015); 
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five resolutions wound up on President Obama’s desk.141 As expected, he 
vetoed all of them, but for Republicans, delivering the message mattered.142 
The floor debates were essential and forcing vulnerable Democrats to take 
votes on controversial regulations was key. No president had ever vetoed a 
CRA resolution since the legislation’s passage in 1996.143 When President 
Obama halted the attempted repeal of the National Labor Relations 
Board’s representation case procedures rule on March 31, 2015, he was 
likely unaware Republicans would pass four more resolutions to send his 
way.144 
The 2015-2016 CRA resolutions were destined to fail and Republicans 
knew it. President Obama was not going to nullify his administration’s work. 
For Republicans, the CRA was starting to become a regular part of oversight; 
they had successfully established a framework for scrutiny—and more 
importantly—they had majorities for overturning “onerous” regulations. All 
that was needed was a new Republican president who would sign their CRA 
resolutions. 
 
H.R.J. Res. 59, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. Res. 408, 114th Cong. (2015); S.J. Res. 22, 114th 
Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 67, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 68, 114th Cong. (2015); 
H.R.J. Res. 70, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 72, 114th Cong. (2015); S.J. Res. 24, 114th 
Cong. (2015); S.J. Res. 23, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 71, 114th Cong. (2015); S.J. Res. 
25, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 74, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. Res. 539, 114th Cong. 
(2015); S.J. Res. 27, 114th Cong. (2015); S.J. Res. 28, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. Res. 583, 
114th Cong. (2016); H.R.J. Res. 87, 114th Cong. (2016); S.J. Res. 33, 114th Cong. (2016); 
H.R.J. Res. 88, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R. Res. 706, 114th Cong. (2016); S.J. Res. 34, 114th 
Cong. (2016); S.J. Res. 35, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R.J. Res. 95, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R. 
Res. 836, 114th Cong. (2016); S.J. Res. 38, 114th Cong. (2016); S.J. Res. 37, 114th Cong. 
(2016); H.R. Res. 921, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R.J. Res. 107, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R.J. Res. 
108, 114th Cong. (2016). 
 141. S.J. Res. 8, 114th Cong. (2015) (disapproving rule submitted by the National Labor 
Relations Board relating to representation case procedures); S.J. Res. 22, 114th Cong. (2015) 
(disapproving rule regarding the definition of “waters of the United States” under the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act); S.J. Res. 24, 114th Cong. (2015) (disapproving rule submitted 
regarding “Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units”); S.J. Res. 23, 114th Cong. (2015) (disapproving a rule regarding 
“Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and 
Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units”); H.R.J. Res. 88, 114th 
Cong. (2016) (disapproving rule submitted by the Department of Labor regarding the 
definition of the term “Fiduciary”). 
 142. Joint Resolution of Disapproval, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Joint_resolution_of_disapproval_(administrative_state)#cite_note-
smithsonian-6 [https://perma.cc/PLN9-AXW8]. 
 143. Jason Daley, What is the Congressional Review Act?, Smithsonian (Feb. 10, 
2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/what-congressional-review-act-
180962031/ [https://perma.cc/W9BH-U2L3]. 
 144. See S.J. Res. 8, 114th Cong. (2015). 
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B. The CRA in 2017-2018 
President Obama and the Electoral College created a confluence of 
perfect circumstances for Republicans. The Obama Administration 
managed to churn out 119 major rules in 2016.145 Consider the regulatory 
output at the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in 
December of 2016; it managed to conclude reviews of ninety-nine 
regulations that month—the most since December 1993.146 
Leading up to the 2016 election, conservative policymakers started to 
gather a list of potential rules that then-presidential-candidate Donald 
Trump could help nullify following his election.147 When he won in 
November, his transition team sat down with House and Senate leaders to 
arrive at a consensus regarding a set of rules that could likely garner 
majorities in both congressional bodies.148 Outside of these private 
conversations, many speculated that President Trump would eventually sign 
between eight and twelve successful CRA measures.149 There were few 
public predictions for the actual number: sixteen.150 But even that number 
has an asterisk because of new developments in Congress with the CRA.151 
In the end, the actual list of regulations overturned contained a few 
notable regulations in the energy and environmental world, but there were 
also rules few had ever heard of before, including many regulatory policy 
practitioners. The final list of disapproved rules, from a record seventy-three 
resolutions of disapproval introduced, contained sixteen regulations (250 
percent more than the record from 2015-2016).152 
 
 145. See Lemieux, supra note 135, at 6. 
 146. See Executive Order Search Results, OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, 
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoAdvancedSearch [https://perma.cc/M7AC-N6A5] 
(searching Dec. 1, 2016, through Dec. 31, 2016). 
 147. See Lemieux, supra note 135, at 6–7. 
 148. The author personally discussed the issue with House and Senate staff. In 
December 2016, House and Senate leaders huddled with the transition team to determine 
which rules could pass both Houses of Congress. 
 149. This was based on personal conversations with Washington-based regulatory policy 
scholars. Some predicted only one or two regulations would be repealed, but others 
predicted a mid-range of roughly eight to twelve. 
 150. Steven Dinan, GOP Rolled Back 14 of 15 Obama Rules Using Congressional 
Review Act, WASH. TIMES, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/15/gop-
rolled-back-14-of-15-obama-rules-using-congress/ [https://perma.cc/YM5E-K6MF]. 
 151. Susan E. Dudley, We Haven’t Seen the Last of the CRA Yet, FORBES, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/susandudley/2017/10/31/we-havent-seen-the-last-of-the-cra-
yet/ [https://perma.cc/JMF5-42WY]. 
 152. See Erin Kelly, Republicans Seek Quick Repeal of Latest Obama 
Administration Regulations, USA Today, (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
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The number of resolutions certainly stands out because some 
questioned whether President Trump would be able to sign more than one 
or two CRA resolutions.153 However, the most surprising development is 
that the list included four major rules.154 The CRA provides that a major rule 
is one that: (1) has an economic impact of $100 million; (2) will have a 
significant increase in prices for consumers; or (3) will have adverse impacts 
on competition or employment.155 
The penultimate rule on the list—CFPB’s arbitration rule—was actually 
not a product of the Obama Administration.156 It was published on July 19, 
2017, with costs exceeding $370 million, and was a product of a federal 
agency many Republicans wanted to repeal, along with an Obama appointee 
running the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.157 Had former CFPB 
Director Richard Cordray continued to serve, Republicans likely would 
have continued to use the CRA to rescind every controversial regulation he 
helped to promulgate. 
In the end, the 2017-2018 CRA period easily broke records for 
number of resolutions introduced (seventy-three), number of rules 
rescinded (sixteen), and number of resolutions to pass a chamber 
(eighteen).158 More importantly than the volume of resolutions passed, was 
the change in behavior. All of Congress, including Democrats, now 




 153. See id. 
 154. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., MAJOR RULE REPORT ON ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENTS (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/686499.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9Q7-
P8Z5]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., MAJOR RULE REPORT ON 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND STATE PLANS (2016), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/682020.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F2QU-BPVC]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., MAJOR RULE 
REPORT 
ON PAYMENTS BY RESOURCE EXTRACTION ISSUERS (2016), https://www.gao.gov/assets/680
/679328.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7YD-K5JX]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., MAJOR 
RULE REPORT ON FAIR PAY AND SAFE WORKPLACES (2016), https://www.gao.gov/assets/6
80/679982.pdf [https://perma.cc/26E5-ZY7T]. 
 155. 5 U.S.C. § 804(2) (1996). 
 156. See Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33, 210 (July 19, 2017) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 1040). 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Jenna Lewinstein, A Brief History of Trump’s Use of the Congressional 
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institutionalized as not just a deregulatory tool, but the legislative veto 2.0 
that each party can wield to rein in a president. 
After the public attention the CRA received recently, the law is no 
longer a forgotten legislative tool. It is a part of Congress’ toolkit, just like 
appropriations riders or oversight hearings. The CRA’s use might ebb year-
to-year, but both parties will find it useful when confronted with regulations 
they find truly odious. 
IV. FROM REGULATORY CUDGEL TO BIPARTISAN WEAPON 
There is little doubt the CRA was used as a deregulatory weapon by 
Republicans during the early years of Trump Administration.159 However, 
these deregulatory impulses are often bipartisan. In some instances, the 
CRA can overturn regulations that are deregulatory in nature.160 As noted 
above, Democrats frequently introduced CRA resolutions during the first 
few years of the Bush Administration.161 However, naturally, there were few 
reasons to introduce resolutions when President Obama took office. Yet, 
conservative Democrats nevertheless challenged a few controversial EPA 
regulations.162 
A. Progressive Conflict with CRA 
Beginning in 2017, there was plenty of progressive angst within the 
Democratic Party over the CRA.163 What had largely been a nuisance during 
the Obama years now had the possibility to repeal several notable 
regulations during the first few months of the Trump Administration. 
Predictably, the CRA came under heavy scrutiny from progressive ranks.164 
During the first few CRA votes of 2017, Democrats almost universally 
opposed every CRA resolution put on the House and Senate floors.165 They 
not only talked about the negative environmental and public health 
consequences of rescinding regulations, but also about the long-term 
 
 159. “Because of senseless, onerous regulations like the [S]tream [P]rotection [R]ule, 
the liberals in Washington have succeeded in putting most coal miners out of work.” 163 
CONG. REC. H840–48 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 2017) (statement of Rep. James Comer). 
 160. See S.J. Res. 52, 115th Cong. (2018) (aiming to nullify the FCC’s repeal of net 
neutrality protection). 
 161. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 17, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 162. See, e.g., See H.R. J. Res. 76, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 163. See Goodwin, supra note 50. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See, e.g., H. Roll Call Vote No. 202, 115th Cong. (2017) (voting to overturn the 
FCC’s privacy rule received zero Democratic votes in the House and Senate; S.J. Res. 34); 
S. Roll Call Vote No. 94, 115th Cong. (2017). 
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consequences of the CRA.166 For example, during the debate over the 
Department of Interior’s “Stream Protection Rule,” Representative Raúl 
Grijalva remarked, 
The use of the Congressional Review Act has been categorized as 
reckless and extreme. . . . The CRA was going to cause significant 
and lasting harm. If successful, two things are going to happen: 
the regulation is void and the agency is prohibited from issuing 
another similar rule ever again.167 
Similarly, during the debate over the Stream Protection Rule in the 
Senate, Senator Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) noted, “[T]he Congressional 
Review Act, is a particularly blunt instrument. The Congressional Review 
Act allows the majority to rush a resolution of disapproval through the 
Senate with limited debate and only a limited opportunity for Americans to 
see what Congress is doing.”168 The definition of “rush” is, of course, subject 
to varying interpretations as well. In the Senate, the CRA provides for up to 
ten hours of debate, divided equally between the two sides.169 Senator Van 
Hollen continued, “But a resolution of disapproval under the Congressional 
Review Act does not just send a rule back to the drawing board. Instead, the 
resolution repeals the rule and prohibits the Agency from ever proposing 
anything like it again.”170 
Again, for most of the debate, Democrats levied arguments for the rule 
Congress was set to repeal and against the very function of the CRA.171 To 
many progressives, the CRA would not just upend a rule, it would prevent 
the agency—perhaps even one guided by progressive hands—from issuing a 
replacement rule in the future because of the statute’s ‘substantially the 
same” restrictions.172 
What CRA critics do not mention, however, is that Congress—if it 
really wanted to—could simply undo a resolution of disapproval.173 When 
Democrats had strong majorities in Congress in 2009, they could have voted 
to extended new authority to the Department of Labor to reissue an 
ergonomics rule. However, they did not, and the legal uncertainty around 
 
 166. See, e.g., 163 CONG. REC. H840–48 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 2017) (statement of Rep. 
Dan Beyer) (“Most importantly, the Congressional Review Act doesn’t make sense here. If 
you want to trim a tree, you don’t chop it down and bury it under cement so it will never 
grow again.”). 
 167. Id. 
 168. See 163 CONG. REC. 611–32 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2017). 
 169. 5 U.S.C. § 802(d)(2). 
 170. See 163 CONG. REC., supra note 168, at 611–32. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See Finkel & Sullivan, supra note 101, at 710. 
 173. See U.S. CONST. art. I. 
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the CRA likely limited the agency from attempting to reissue a new rule.174 
Regardless, what Congress takes away with a resolution of disapproval, it can 
restore by passing another law.175 
B. Senate Democrats Embraces the CRA 
The CRA was created to curb “onerous” federal regulations. Yet, as 
discussed above, that definition has different meanings to different political 
parties. For example, just five days after FCC published a rule rescinding 
net neutrality rules, 176 Democrats made net neutrality a voting issue in the 
Senate when Senator Edward Markey (D-MA) introduced a resolution of 
disapproval to rescind FCC’s rescission of open internet regulations.177 The 
resolution of disapproval quickly garnered forty-eight cosponsors, far more 
than the thirty required to generate a discharge petition under the CRA.178 
By May 2018, there was a scheduled vote and it amassed fifty-two votes—
enough for passage under the CRA.179 No Democrat voted against the 
measure and two Republicans joined them.180 To Senate Democrats and the 
moderate Republicans who joined them, the CRA was actually a pro-
regulatory tool that would ensure internet consumer protections. Given the 
CRA’s general ability to strike down any regulation, including deregulatory 
actions, it is a tool for Congress, not necessarily a deregulatory cudgel, as 
detractors sometimes label the Act. 
In the House, however, despite 169 cosponsors, Republican 
leadership had no desire to buck the president and a conservative FCC.181 
Although there might have been 200 votes for repeal, Republican leadership 
would never let a repeal go to a vote unless there were 218 Members on the 
resolution of disapproval. Although it did not pass, the net neutrality vote is 
one of only thirty CRA resolutions to ever pass a chamber of Congress. The 
FCC is an enticing target for progressives, as two other FCC rules were 
 
 174. See Finkel & Sullivan, supra note 101, at 729. 
 175. See 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2) (1996) (allowing for the passage of another law as long as 
it is not in “substantially” the same form). 
 176. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., MAJOR RULE REPORT ON RESTORING 
INTERNET FREEDOM (2018), https://www.gao.gov/products/D18805#mt=e-report 
[https://perma.cc/J542-J4AT]. 
 177. See S.J. Res. 52, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 178. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 802(c). 
 179. See Senate Roll Call Vote no. 97, 115th Cong. (May 16, 2018) (S.J. Res. 52, 
115th Cong. (2018)), https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.
cfm?congress=115&session=2&vote=00097 [https://perma.cc/Y3U3-B6FW]. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See H.R.J. Res.129, 115th Cong. (2018). 
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struck down in the Senate as well, but they all ultimately failed to gain steam 
in the House.182 
Implications of net neutrality repeal would have been broad had it 
passed. It would have restored “Title II” internet protections for consumers 
and content providers, but part of the original regulation included an 
important “transparency rule” that policymakers on both sides of the aisle 
supported.183 Given that a substantially similar new rule from FCC cannot 
be issued, FCC would have been barred from issuing another transparency 
provision?184 There will be an additional discussion of this below, but this is 
just one reason why some wonder whether net neutrality will be a “zombie 
regulation,” wandering “half alive and half dead” in regulatory purgatory.185 
Congressional action will now be required to resolve these issues. Avoiding 
such action may have been the original motivation of Democrats sponsoring 
the resolution in the first place.186 
1. Progressives Challenge the CRA in Court 
Discontent with the CRA may have reached its peak when the Center 
for Biological Diversity sued the Trump Administration, arguing the CRA 
was unconstitutional.187 Like the earlier legislative veto struck down in 
Chadha, the plaintiffs argued the CRA violated both the bicameralism and 
presentment requirements and the “Take Care” Clause in Article II of the 
U.S. Constitution.188 
Those contending the CRA’s constitutionality were dismissed at the 
time; their survival hinged on the approval from both congressional 
chambers and the president’s signature. After the Trump Administration 
filed a motion to dismiss, the federal court agreed as well.189 Judge Sharon 
L. Gleason wrote: 
[G]iven that the CRA is itself a law passed by Congress pursuant 
to the mechanisms outlined in the Constitution, [the plaintiff] 
 
 182. See id. 
 183. See Will Rinehart, The Congressional Review Act Might Not Fully Restore Net 
Neutrality, Leaving It a Zombie Regulation, AM. ACTION F. (Apr. 19, 2018), 
https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/congressional-review-act-might-not-fully-
restore-net-neutrality-leaving-zombie-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/93HQ-CNJN]. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, 313 F. Supp. 3d 976 (D. Alaska 2018). 
 188. Id. at 980. 
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does not adequately explain how the Take Care Clause mandates 
that the executive branch should retain authority that Congress, 
with Presidential approval, withdrew from it through [passage of 
a joint resolution].190 
A CRA resolution itself does not violate bicameralism and 
presentment since it must pass both floors of Congress and get a presidential 
signature.191 However, a creative plaintiff in this case argued that Congress 
needed to amend the underlying statute, not vitiate a rule amending the 
statute.192 The plaintiffs also argued that the “substantially the same form” 
language in the CRA “creat[es] a large and unconstitutional shadow effect 
that undermines Interior’s rulemaking authority.”193 This shadow effect is 
obviously real, but only because no agency has ever tested it. 
Suppose an agency, for example, reissues an ergonomics rule that is a 
vastly scaled down version of its predecessor from 2001. If Congress does 
not use the CRA to rescind it, does that mean it is substantially different? 
Perhaps with technological changes and the passage of time, a rule must 
necessarily be different after eighteen years. These are all questions an 
executive could answer if it reissued a rule under the CRA—a move the CRA 
does not bar but establishes parameters to ensure agencies do not reissue 
the exact same rule to flout Congress.194 
The plaintiffs went on to note that this effect violates the separation of 
powers between Articles I and II.195 Judge Gleason dismissed this argument 
as well, noting the CRA “was also passed by both houses of Congress and 
signed into law by the President. Thus, the requirements of bicameralism 
and presentment are met and [plaintiff’s] separation of powers concerns fail 
to state a plausible claim for relief.”196 
As a result of Center for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, the CRA 
appears safe from constitutional challenges for the near future. Yet, if 
roughly eighteen years pass and future agencies are shy about reissuing new 
rules, constitutional claims could arise again. It is more likely, however, that 
both sides of the aisle will use the CRA strategically to check the president. 
 
 190. See Zinke, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 990. 
 191. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946–51 (1983) (stating that the Constitution requires 
that all legislative action must pass the House and Senate and be signed by the President). 
 192. Zinke, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 983. 
 193. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (footnote omitted). 
 194. See 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1–2) (2018). 
 195. See Zinke, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 987–88. 
 196. Id. at 988. 
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2. Public Interest Groups Urge Repeal 
Even after Zinke and limited Democratic embrace of the CRA, there 
were still progressive groups calling for Congress to abandon this tool. For 
example, the Center for Progressive Reform (CPR), a left-leaning policy 
organization, was heavily critical of Congress’s use of the CRA during the 
Trump Administration.197 In 2018, they released, “The Congressional 
Review Act: The Case for Repeal,” documenting the public health and 
safety reasons for jettisoning the CRA.198 The authors argued, “By unwinding 
the significant public health, safety, environmental, or financial security 
protections these safeguards would have otherwise delivered, each CRA 
resolution that is adopted boils down to a direct assault on the public 
interest.”199 Naturally, different political parties have unique views of what 
constitutes the “public interest.”200 For Democrats, this generally includes 
strong environmental and public safety rules.201 For Republicans, the public 
interest may benefit from fewer “onerous” regulatory restrictions.202 
Ironically, Public Citizen, another progressive policy organization, was 
vocal about the use of the CRA in 2017.203 In 2017, two of its scholars wrote 
“Scrap the Congressional Review Act.”204 They argued: 
The CRA should be repealed for two reasons. First, far from its 
promise of making Congress accountable to the public, in 
practice the CRA simply made Congress even more beholden to 
corporate interests. . . . The second reason to repeal the CRA is 
that it is so poorly drafted and vague that members of Congress 
cannot agree on how to interpret the plain language of the bill. 
For example, the CRA prohibits agencies from reissuing rules 
that are “substantially the same” as any rule overturned under the 
law, unless Congress passes a new law reauthorizing the rule. This 
draconian element of the CRA is one of the main reasons it 
should never have been used.205 
 
 197. See Goodwin, supra note 50. 
 198. Thomas O. McGarity et al., The Congressional Review Act: The Case for 
Repeal, THE CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM (May 2018), http://progressivereform.org/art
icles/CRA_Repeal_Case_050218.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ATT-4UEJ]. 
 199. Id. at 1.  
 200. Id. 
 201. Id.  
 202. Id.  
 203. See Lisa Gilbert & Amit Narang, Scrap the Congressional Review Act, REG. REV. 
(Jun. 7, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/06/07/gilbert-narang-scrap-congressional-
review-act/ [https://perma.cc/5SJR-CAPK]. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
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These are defensible policy arguments against the CRA, but no action 
better captures progressive angst with the CRA than Public Citizen’s 
decision to support a resolution of the disapproval for FCC’s net neutrality 
repeal just eight months after this op-ed.206 Progressive groups may not love 
the use of the CRA at all times, but in this instance—when it is designed to 
produce a favorable policy outcome—resolutions of disapproval can come 
in handy. This is one glaring example of why, despite the number of 
progressives or conservatives in Congress, they will likely never vote to 
repeal the entire CRA. 
The volume of CRA resolutions introduced by Democrats during the 
Bush Administration also supports this prediction.207 It also tends to rebut 
the argument that the CRA solely acts to diminish public safety protections. 
Democrats introduced six of the thirteen CRA resolutions from 2001 to 
2003.208 Their reasons were varied: from expanding access to reproductive 
services, to ensuring new arsenic standards became effective more quickly.209 
Had these CRA resolutions succeeded, progressive groups likely would 
have praised the end result.  
C. CRA Meets Guidance 
The CRA took its most expansive turn following a provocative Wall 
Street Journal editorial.210 Shortly after President Trump took office, 
Kimberly Strassel wrote “A GOP Regulatory Game Changer.”211 Virtually 
everyone knew Republicans could use the CRA to overturn a handful of 
rules issued in the last few months of the Obama Administration, but this 
hardly constituted a “game changer.” 
Strassel did not limit her op-ed to just regulations from 2016.212 This 
game changer involved overturning rules and guidance dating back to the 
beginning of the Obama Administration, or perhaps even earlier.213 Strassel 
explained, “It turns out that the first line of the CRA requires any federal 
agency promulgating a rule to submit a ‘report’ on it to the House and 
 
 206. See Pierce Stanley, Over 50 Major Progressive Groups Urge Democrats to Support 
CRA Resolution to Restore Net Neutrality, DEMAND PROGRESS (Feb. 28, 2018), 
https://demandprogress.org/50-major-progressive-groups-urge-democrats-support-cra-
resolution-restore-net-neutrality/ [https://perma.cc/5WTN-J265]. 
 207. See supra notes 93–101 and accompanying text. 
 208. See id. 
 209. See H.R.J. Res. 32, 107th Cong. (2001); S.J. Res. 14, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 210. See Strassel, supra note 13. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
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Senate. The 60-day clock starts either when the rule is published or when 
Congress receives the report—whichever comes later.”214 According to the 
Pacific Legal Foundation’s Todd Gaziano, there were supposed to be 
consequences when agencies failed to notify Congress of a rule.215 
Based on Strassel’s premise, any rule that an agency failed to submit to 
Congress would technically be ineffective, even though private actors might 
follow the rule.216 The language of the CRA is somewhat clear, “Before a 
rule can take effect, the Federal agency promulgating such a rule shall 
submit to each House of Congress and to the Comptroller General a report 
. . . .”217 Under Strassel’s logic, any prior rule, including guidance, could be 
challenged if an agency failed to submit it to Congress.218 This would include 
measures dating back to 1996, when Congress passed the CRA.219 
Naturally, there is always some skepticism whenever one reads a 
simple trick to undo countless controversial regulations. The Strassel op-ed 
was viewed cautiously even by supporters of aggressive CRA action.220 
However, it was enough to convince Senator Pat Toomey (R-PA) to issue a 
request to the GAO to determine whether past guidance could be 
considered a rule under the CRA.221 On October 19, 2017, roughly nine 
months after the Strassel op-ed, the GAO found that past guidance on 
leveraged lending was “a general statement of policy and is a rule under 
CRA, which must be submitted to Congress for review.”222 Like thousands 
of rules and other guidance documents, the leveraged-lending rule was 
never submitted to Congress, giving Republicans some legal leverage to 
undo past guidance.223 
 
 214. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 215. See Strassel, supra note 13. 
 216. Id. 
 217. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A) (2018). 
 218. See Strassel, supra note 13. 
 219. Id. 
 220. This included many in the Washington, D.C. regulatory community who were 
skeptical the CRA could be used as a tool to overturn regulation from years prior. See Clyde 
Wayne Crews, Jr., Lame Duck Update: Here’s How The 115th Congress Tried To 




 221. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., B-329272, LETTER TO SENATOR 
TOOMEY (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.gao.gov/products/B-329272 [https://perma.cc/S34C-
U9F4]. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
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1. Partisan Implications 
With the legal arguments in place, Republicans quickly scoured their 
caucus for a past guidance document they could rescind.224 Since virtually all 
guidance fails to make its way to Congress, the universe was vast. 
Republicans settled on a CFPB rule on auto lending standards.225 
Senator Jerry Moran (R-KS) introduced the resolution of disapproval 
on March 22, 2018; it became law less than two months later.226 The debates 
in Congress around overturning a guidance document issued in 2013 (well 
outside of the traditional carryover period stipulated by the CRA) were 
especially contentious.227 Senator Sherrod Brown (D-OH) argued this 
regulatory game changer was an illegal loophole to further push a 
deregulatory agenda. He argued: 
[T]oo much time has passed for Congress to use the 
Congressional Review Act to roll back other protections the last 
administration put in place, but they now want to open up a whole 
new idea. They want to use a legal loophole to interfere with 
potentially thousands more Federal decisions, potentially going 
back as far as 20 years.228 
Despite pleas from Democrats to avoid axing another federal rule—this 
time issued in 2013, not 2016—Republicans prevailed on their vote to 
overturn guidance: fifty-one to forty-seven.229 In the House, the story was the 
same. However, the House did not vote until three weeks later.230 
Representative Maxine Waters (D-CA) argued that using the CRA to strike 
down old guidance “sets a dangerous precedent.”231 She went on to note, 
“While congressional Republicans so far have been very active in using the 
Congressional Review Act to tear down important regulations that protect 
Americans, today they are expanding their harmful efforts even further to 
now go after regulatory guidance issued by the Consumer Bureau years 
ago.”232 Despite these arguments, predictably, the House voted along party 
lines to disapprove CFPB’s guidance: 234–175.233 
 
 224. This was based on personal experiences, as congressional staffers contacted me to 
look for notable guidance that agencies never submitted to Congress. 
 225. See S.J. Res. 57, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 226. See Pub. L. No. 115-172, 132 Stat. 1290 (2018). 
 227. See 164 CONG. REC. S2,200—11, (daily ed. Apr. 17, 2018). 
 228. Id. 
 229. See Sen. Roll Call Vote No. 76, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 230. See S.J. Res. 57, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 231. See 164 CONG. REC. H3, 815–23 (daily ed. May 8, 2018). 
 232. Id. 
 233. See H. Roll Call Vote No. 171, 115th Cong. (2018). 
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2. Structural Implications 
Although the partisan implications were clear from the precedent 
Republicans set overturning guidance, it is not clear whether Congress was 
aware of the magnitude of their action. Now the party in power could reach 
back years to overturn guidance never submitted to Congress. The structural 
implications are profound from a balance-of-power perspective. 
Consider what this action does for every future executive, regardless of 
political party. Guidance, already reviewed by agency attorneys, now will 
likely go through another round of critical review and be sent to Congress. 
Otherwise, a future Congress could not only rescind it, but also ensure the 
rule will never be reissued in “substantially the same form.” One could 
argue this largely forgotten guidance vote is already changing agency 
behavior. Consider, according to the GAO, the Trump Administration has 
submitted sixteen guidance documents to the GAO and Congress.234 One 
CRA resolution has proven to be enough to at least partially change agency 
behavior. This is far more than just undoing an agency rule in a vacuum; it 
is enough to change both the substance—through signaling and barring 
future agency guidance—and procedure of the executive branch. 
The implications of Congress striking down this little-known CFPB 
rule should be examined further by scholars, but it is a near certainty that 
even Democrats will avail themselves of this power if they gain control of 
both chambers of Congress and the Presidency. Again, this is a 
development practically no one predicted at the outset of the CRA wave. 
In the future, a Democratic president could have his or her agencies 
overturn a Trump guidance document, but using the CRA to prevent 
conservatives from issuing substantially similar guidance in the future is an 
incredible power that Congress has only begun to exploit. The ability to 
nullify major regulatory guidance—indeed virtually every action of a 
president—is a notable shift in the balance of power between the executive 
and legislative branches. It is unlikely President Trump will tout this 
accomplishment as a regulatory landmark, but his agencies are now on 
notice. 
 
 234. See Database of Rules, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., 
https://www.gao.gov/legal/other-legal-work/congressional-review-act#database (use keyword 
“guidance”; Date Published in Federal Register “01/20/2017” to “08/30/2018”; Rule 
Effective Date ending “12/31/2019”; Date Received by GAO ending “08/30/2018”) 
[https://perma.cc/K69E-PL43]. 
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V. WHAT’S NEXT FOR THE CRA 
The CRA already has lived a life longer than many expected in the 
Trump Administration. It was employed sixteen times, dwarfing original 
expectations.235 It is clear that Congress will continue using the CRA to 
nullify regulations in the future. The question is to what extent? Republicans 
will surely use it to strike down what they view as “onerous” regulations. 
Democrats, as evidenced from their push to stop FCC’s repeal of net 
neutrality, will employ the CRA to the extent the rescission of rules can 
ensure a progressive end. 
This final section offers some predictions for how future legislators will 
use the CRA. It will cover possible mass changes in how Congress reviews 
executive guidance, the role of independent agencies under the CRA, the 
partisan lens of the law, and how courts might interpret the CRA’s 
“substantially similar” bar. 
A. Guidance in Jeopardy 
If the vote to overturn CFPB’s auto lending guidance taught future 
presidents anything, it is that the White House counsel’s office and agency 
attorneys will have to add a layer of scrutiny on all executive and 
administrative guidance. Once an aberration, the GAO’s opinion on 
guidance and Congress’s vote demonstrates that most future guidance 
documents are subject to the CRA. 
Based on the GAO’s opinion, not necessarily all guidance is subject to 
repeal—just guidance covered by the CRA.236 In its opinion, the GAO noted 
that the definition of a rule under the CRA is broader than the 
Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) notice and comment 
requirements.237 Accordingly, some agency actions of general policy can fall 
to the level of guidance under the APA, but still be considered rules under 
the CRA.238 
Fortunately, for those seeking a more complete history of how 
guidance should be treated under the CRA, its authors gave fairly clear 
instructions. In the legislative history of the CRA, Senator Nickles was 
explicit that guidance documents should apply.239 He noted: 
 
 235. See id. 
 236. See GAO Issues Opinions on Applicability of Congressional Review Act to Two 
Guidance Documents, supra note 14. 
 237. See id. 
 238. See id. 
 239. See 142 CONG. REC. S3, 683–87 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (providing statements 
from Sens. Nickles, Reid, and Stevens). 
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[T]here is a body of materials that fall within the APA definition 
of a ‘rule’ and are the product of agency process, but that meet 
none of the procedural specifications of the first three classes 
[formal rulemakings, informal rulemakings, administrative staff 
manuals]. These include guidance documents . . . .240 
With this statement, the architects of the CRA made clear that 
guidance is subject to the CRA. If guidance applies, then agencies must 
follow the CRA and submit a report to Congress and GAO. This is hardly 
a high bar to climb for agencies, but as with anything in administrative law, 
process matters. 
Observers should note the GAO’s intimate role in applying the CRA. 
The GAO determines whether guidance applies, keeps track of major rules, 
and receives all rules submitted.241 The history of the GAO’s involvement in 
adjudicating what is subject to the CRA actually dates back to September 
1996, six months after the CRA’s passage, according to the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS).242 In their research, CRS noted that the GAO has 
issued thirteen opinions on whether guidance documents are subject to the 
CRA.243 In nine of the thirteen cases, the GAO found that the guidance 
document was a rule within the context of the CRA.244 The CRS opinion 
also was clear on what will happen if agencies fail to recognize the CRA 
covers guidance: “If a joint resolution disapproving [a guidance document] 
were to be enacted, the guidance would immediately no longer be in effect 
and the agencies would be prohibited from issuing guidance that is 
‘substantially the same.’”245 This finding only applies to guidance documents 
that act as general statements of policy, however.246 In other words, they are 
“statements issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the 
manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power.”247 
Past congressional votes to overturn guidance, the GAO’s opinions, 
and CRS’s research provide ample, legitimate reasons for future presidents 
 
 240. Id. 
 241. See GAO Issues Opinions on Applicability of Congressional Review Act to Two 
Guidance Documents, supra note 14; see also Database of Rules and FAQs, GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., https://www.gao.gov/legal/other-legal-work/congressional-review-act 
[https://perma.cc/PHT4-7BX7]. 
 242. See Congressional Research Service Report R43992, EVERYCRSREPORT (2016), 
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20171025_IN10808_76b115b319aff817387c33bd6e7
86d2e3fd06cb4.html [https://perma.cc/US69-X75X]. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 197 (1993) (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 
U.S. 281, 302, n.31 (1979) (internal quotation and citation omitted)). 
 247. Id. 
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to treat future guidance like ordinary rulemaking and follow the CRA’s 
strictures. 
B. Independent Agency Limbo 
When President Trump took office in January 2017, some of 
President Obama’s appointees were still heading independent agencies—
most notably the CFPB Director Richard Cordray.248 At the time, there was 
little discussion of nullifying rules beyond the CRA’s carryover period 
covering measures issued late in the Obama Administration. However, 
political circumstances quickly changed that calculus. 
The day after CFPB published its rule on arbitration agreements, 
Congressman Keith Rothfus (R-PA) introduced a resolution of 
disapproval.249 The rule was overturned roughly three months later.250 
Although the carryover period had expired for Obama-era rules, Congress 
was looking for any regulation with which it disagreed. 
This scenario is likely to play out during future administrations. The 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the CFPB examples above are 
illustrative. It took roughly sixteen months for President Trump to fill FTC 
with a new slate of commissioners.251 During future presidential transitions, 
holdover appointees from independent agencies still have power to regulate. 
Until 2017, none of their regulations had ever been struck down under the 
CRA.252 Given Congress’s track record in 2017 and 2018, future 
independent agency appointees will likely refrain from regulating if they fear 
Congress and the president may object to new regulations. 
Granted, presidential transitions already are times of change in cabinet 
and independent agencies, but the CRA’s institutionalization will make 
future agencies think twice about issuing controversial rules until the 
president has had a chance to nominate and confirm new appointees. 
Otherwise, as CFPB learned with its arbitration rule, more than two years’ 
 
 248. See Renae Merle, Richard Cordray Defends CFPB Arbitration Rule Amid 




 249. See Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33,210 (July 19, 2017) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 1040); H.R.J. Res. 111, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 250. See H.R. Roll Call Vote No. 412, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 251. See Harper Neidig, Senate Confirms Full Slate of FTC Commissioners, THE HILL 
(Apr. 26, 2018), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/385096-senate-confirms-full-slate-of-
ftc-commissioners [https://perma.cc/J8KY-7QLX]. 
 252. See Dudley, supra note 153. 
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worth of work will be undone in a matter of weeks.253 The CRA’s recent 
renaissance has taught the executive branch that all agencies are on notice—
both cabinet and independent. 
C. Beyond “Substantially the Same Form” 
Other legal commentators and scholars have written about the fate of 
overturned rules and whether the CRA permits “substantially similar” rules 
from returning.254 Much of this literature has been hypothetical in nature—
speculating on what future courts might do with a new regulation that is 
“substantially [in] the same form” as a rule Congress overturned via the 
CRA.255 Now that there are sixteen regulations overturned under the CRA 
process, as opposed to just one, and the process has become 
institutionalized, agencies are far more likely to revisit at least one 
overturned regulation in the future.256 Given the controversial nature of the 
regulations rescinded, a lawsuit would likely result, and we will finally have 
some judicial clarity on what constitutes a substantially dissimilar rule under 
the CRA. 
As a threshold matter, there is some disagreement about the 
justiciability of the CRA.257 CRA Section 805 provides: “[n]o determination, 
finding, action, or omission under this chapter shall be subject to judicial 
review.”258 The CRA’s authors were clear in their legislative history that 
courts were not to intervene during the legislative process or assume 
 
 253. See Unified Agenda and Regulatory Plan Search Results, OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, 
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/Forward?SearchTarget=Agenda&textfield=3170-AA51 
[https://perma.cc/K3YM-WFYB]. Note that the Arbitration Rule was introduced in the 
spring of 2015. It was not finalized until July 19, 2017. 
 254. See Finkel & Sullivan, supra note 101. 
 255. Id. at 710. 
 256. House Republican Conf., supra note 4. 
 257. See MAEVE P. CAREY ET AL., THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT (CRA): 
FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS 18 (2016), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43992 
[https://perma.cc/4ESW-EP4S]. The report notes: 
Section 805 of the CRA states that ‘[n]o determination, finding, action, or 
omission under this chapter shall be subject to judicial review.’ Two federal 
appeals courts and several federal district courts have examined this section and 
determined that it unambiguously prohibits judicial review of any question 
arising under the CRA. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). Yet, this history relates to Congress’ actions during the CRA process, 
not necessarily whether an overturned rule is substantially similar. 
 258. 5 U.S.C. § 805 (2018). 
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congressional intent from failing to adopt a resolution of disapproval.259 This 
language does not mean that a court must refrain from determining whether 
an agency issued a substantially similar rule. Otherwise, if courts could not 
review new agency actions to restore rules and Congress generally agreed 
with the new rules, injured parties would have no recourse to challenge a 
rule almost identical to the original. 
Moreover, the CRA’s authors were clear that the courts would have 
some role in adjudicating claims arising from the law.260 Senator Nickles 
noted, “[A] court with proper jurisdiction may review the resolution of 
disapproval and the law that authorized the disapproved rule to determine 
whether the issuing agency has the legal authority to issue a substantially 
different rule.”261 This seems clear enough that courts can have a role in 
deciding what is substantially the same and what is substantially different. 
Senator Nickles continued, “The limitation on judicial review in no way 
prohibits a court from determining whether a rule is in effect.”262 If courts 
do have power to examine new rules after a resolution of disapproval, the 
big question is how should they accomplishment this task? 
There is some instructive language in the CRA, but not much. When 
CRS was tasked with answering this question, they gave a varied response. 
“[S]ameness could be determined by scope, penalty level, textual similarity, 
or administrative policy, among other factors.”263 The CRS’s authors 
arguably provided the most helpful hint: “In deciding cases or controversies 
properly before it, a court or agency must give effect to the intent of the 
Congress when such a resolution is enacted and becomes the law of the 
land.”264 In other words, looking to the congressional record as to why 
Congress struck down a rule might be most illustrative. However, if the 
Congressional Record is sparse, or if Congress only spoke of removing an 
onerous regulation in toto, divining intent will not be easy for a judge. 
The CRA’s drafters also established a hierarchy of discretion, from 
broadest to most restrictive, relying on the text and grant of authority of the 
underlying statute.265 Three important points emerge from that statement. 
 
 259. See 142 CONG. REC. S3, 683–87 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement by Sens. 
Nickles, Reid, and Stevens). 
 260. See id. 
 261. See id. 
 262. See id. 
 263. MAEVE P. CAREY ET AL., THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT (CRA): FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS 18 (2016), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43992 
[https://perma.cc/4ESW-EP4S]. 
 264. See 142 CONG. REC. S3, 683–87 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (providing statements 
from Sens. Nickles, Reid, and Stevens). 
 265. See id. 
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First, if the law authorizing the disapproved rule provided broad 
discretion to the agency, then regulators would likely have similarly 
expansive authority to issue a substantially different rule.266 That information 
is helpful, but it does not clarify where to draw the line between substantial 
and minor differences. 
Second, if the original law that authorized the initial agency action did 
not mandate a particular rule, then regulators have discretion “not to issue 
any new rule.”267 While this does not directly address how to interpret 
“substantially similar,” it does illustrate how the CRA’s drafters placed great 
importance on congressional intent—with respect to whether a given agency 
could return to the regulatory drawing board. If Congress were to strike 
down a new net neutrality rule under the CRA, for example, then the FCC 
could choose not to issue another rule at all because no statute specifically 
requires the FCC to do so.268 That second category is important because a 
substantial fraction of federal rules do not have specific mandates and their 
underlying organic statutes are often silent on specifics. For example, the 
ergonomics rule that was struck down in 2001 was not explicitly authorized 
in statute.269 The Department of Labor initiated the rule on its own 
discretion.270 
A third, and perhaps the most important, point is that when Congress 
was explicit in the regulation’s authorizing statute and the grant of power to 
a federal agency was “narrowly circumscribed, [then] the enactment of a 
resolution of disapproval for that rule may work to prohibit the reissuance 
of any rule.”271 This can be interpreted to mean that if, for example, 
Congress states that the level of particulate matter in the atmosphere should 
be limited to twelve micrograms per cubic meter and a CRA measure strikes 
that down, the agency is prohibited from issuing the standard again. 
 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. See, e.g., Henry Goldberg, FCC’s Net Neutrality Decision Corrects Telecom Act 
Mistakes, THE HILL (Mar. 18, 2015), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-
blog/technology/235985-fccs-net-neutrality-decision-corrects-telecom-act-mistakes 
[https://perma.cc/X6QH-7UDP]. 
 269. See Ergonomics Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 68,261, 68,267 (Nov. 14, 2000) (“In the 
absence of a federal OSHA ergonomics standard, OSHA has addressed ergonomics in the 
workplace under the authority of section 5(a)(1) of the OSHAct. This section is referred to 
as the General Duty Clause and requires employers to provide work and a work environment 
free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical 
harm.”). 
 270. Id. 
 271. See 142 CONG. REC. S3, 683–87 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (providing statements 
by Sens. Nickles, Reid, and Stevens). 
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The senators’ explanation of this third category has direct relevance for 
the measures Congress has struck down recently. For instance, Section 1504 
of the 2010 Dodd–Frank financial reform legislation mandated that the SEC 
require resource extraction issuers to disclose payments to foreign 
governments.272 That section was explicit about the information that 
companies had to report.273 Yet, Congress struck down the rule.274 How do 
the attorneys at the SEC craft a new rule that follows section 1504, yet is 
somehow substantially dissimilar from the rule Congress struck down? It is 
an unenviable position and one that does not lend itself to an easy answer. 
There is likely no “right answer.” If presented before a court, a judge will 
have to be the first to jump into these murky legal waters. 
A quantitative versus qualitative test might be appropriate for future 
courts.275 Both do not necessarily answer the “substantially similar” question, 
but they do provide a framework. For instance, take the particulate matter 
example. If an agency codified twelve micrograms per cubic centimeter and 
Congress rescinded it under the CRA, what is a substantially dissimilar rule? 
Is five, ten, fifteen, or twenty? The answer to this question might be 
unknowable, but it would likely lean on rules of reason, conceptions of 
agency deference, and congressional intent. If many years have passed since 
the CRA resolution, tightening the standards to just ten micrograms per 
cubic centimeter might not be viewed as substantially similar. There are a 
host of factors to consider and they are regulation-specific and do not lend 
themselves to an overarching test. 
The qualitative rule (i.e. a regulation without a set numerical formula 
for the private sector) might actually be easier to discern. Courts also will 
have to determine congressional intent, but at least they will not have a rigid 
or finite numerical formula they must navigate. The Volcker Rule is an 
example of a measure without quantitative guidelines. However, there are 
no easy answers for what constitutes a substantially dissimilar Volcker Rule 
either. 
In sum, where there is little agency discretion and Congress has 
explicitly delegated certain tasks to an agency, even if the final rule comports 
with original intent, Congress can change its mind and strike down the rule. 
How can an agency issue a substantially dissimilar rule while concurrently 
 
 272. See Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 81 Fed. Reg. 49,359 
(July 27, 2016). 
 273. Id. 
 274. See H.R.J. Res. 41, 115th Cong. (2017). 
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following the original intent of the statute? It would appear the most recent 
actions of Congress would prevail, and the rule would be barred until 
Congress granted new authority to the agency. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The CRA has enjoyed a renaissance during the Trump 
Administration. Although Republicans have employed the CRA primarily 
to repeal regulations and guidance from the Obama Administration, 
increasingly, Democrats have started to use the CRA to check President 
Trump. The CRA’s explosive growth has led to the institutionalization of 
the law—for both political parties. It is now a weapon employed with each 
controversial new rule. More than a political tool, however, the increased 
use of the CRA has helped to rebalance power between the legislative and 
executive branches. In the future, we can expect both parties will wield the 
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